The Commissar System
The establishment of a Workers and Peasants’ Red Army (RKKA) in late January 1918 presented the Bolshevik Party with a serious problem and with a significant opportunity. The problem was that any army potentially represented a threat to the Party's control of the state. It was a possible internal source of military threat to the Party, controlling as it did substantial armaments and manpower. Also it provided a potential alternative structure of governance. The opportunity was that the RKKA provided the Party with a means of direct social control, indoctrination and education of the masses, something which the new Bolshevik state needed desperately. In fact the role of ‘state indoctrination’ was not new for the army in Russia. The Imperial Russian Army had assumed this role under the tsars; the ‘Dictatorship of the Proletariat’ now established in the former Russian Empire understood how useful the army had been in building loyalty to the state and wished to emulate its success.
Alexander Kerensky, Minister of Defence of the Provisional government which succeeded the tsarist regime in 1917, also understood the need to use the army for social control. It was the Kerensky regime which created a system of military commissars (i.e. commissioners) to maintain discipline in the crumbling Imperial Army and to monitor officers, many of whom remained loyal to the Tsar. This need remained when the Kerensky government was overthrown by the October Revolution and the RKKA replaced the Imperial Russian Army.
'The 2nd All-Russian Congress of Soviets in October 1917 set up "revolutionary committees" at high military levels, and replaced the Kerensky commissars with Soviet ones. Leon Trotsky was given responsibility for organising the new RKKA and immediately adapted the system of commissars, creating a formal dual chain of military and political command throughout the armed forces. For each military commander from battalion up to the highest level, a political "deputy" commander, i.e. the commissar, was appointed. The term politruk (short for politicheskii rukovoditel - "political officer") was used as well as commissar. Politruks included appointees operating at lower level then battalion. Later the term could be used more loosely as ‘slang’ to include all Party activists within the armed forces, often not commissioned. After 1942 a new term appeared and gained widespread currency– zampolit (an abbreviation for "deputy of the commander for political work"). For the sake of clarity, the term ‘commissar’ will be used throughout this article to include any and all officially sanctioned individuals operating within the armed forces to maintain and promote the Party’s interests, not just those holding appointments within the military hierarchy.
As the number of officers who were Party members grew, and former-tsarist officers disappeared from the RKKA, a new system was implemented. Officers who were Party members were allowed total military command while retaining a political assistant for political activity and indoctrination. Non Party-member officers continued under direct political supervision. In theory this meant that Officer Party-members could exercise independent military command. In practice, they still had a political ‘watchdog’, albeit now observing rather then interfering directly.
The dual-control system remained in place in the Soviet Union from the birth of the RKKA up to collapse of the state, except for one very short period. Following the poor performance of the RKKA in the Finnish War of 1939-1940, and seeing the spectacular successes of the German Wermacht against Poland, Britain and France, Stalin apparently realised that a rapid improvement in the readiness of the RKKA was needed. Close political control of the military seemed to militate against this and so, from August 1940 until July 1941, Stalin put full responsibility for combat and political readiness on the military commanders. Commissars were removed from post. This was not to last however, and commissars were reintroduced and their role strengthened as the war went on.
Duties of the Commissar
The principal duty of the commissar was to promote Party interests, especially by:
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supervision of the officers and men in a unit, especially former-tsarist officers
supervision of the officers and men in a unit, especially former-tsarist officers•monitoring political and military activities of the unit
monitoring political and military activities of the unit•indoctrinating all military personnel in Marxist-Leninism
indoctrinating all military personnel in Marxist-Leninism•maintenance of revolutionary order and firmness
maintenance of revolutionary order and firmness •inspiring the soldiery with revolutionary fervour and encouraging ‘socialist competition’
inspiring the soldiery with revolutionary fervour and encouraging ‘socialist competition’The commissar reported directly to the military commander at each level but also answered to a separate chain of command within the Party, reporting directly to the commisar in the next level of the military command structure, e.g. a battalion commisar would report both to the battalion commander and to the regimental commisar. The commissar wore the same uniform as other RKKA officers but he was not on the same career path. Devoted communists were selected by the Party for special schools and training and then entered the RKKA as commissioned political workers. Selection and appointment of commissars was the prerogative of the Party, not the military hierarchy.
The commissar had the authority to override any decision of his military ‘superior’, and to remove him from command if necessary. This was, however, almost never necessary. The mere presence of a commissar usually meant that military commanders would follow Party directives; the day-to-day duties of the commissar generally involved political education work and morale boosting. He was, however, tasked directly to participate in planning for unit training and for combat.
The commissar planned and supervised team building activities, political educational and indoctrination activities and even organised training of soldiers in basic skills such as reading and writing which were deemed useful for Soviet citizens to possess after military service. Targets (‘norms’) were set in ‘Socialist competition’ between personnel and units. These were intended to improve performance in such things as shooting, crew drills, fitness, leadership, etc. Results were reported by Commissars up the ‘political chain’.
The commissar organized local meetings of the party cells and Komsomol. He recruited and developed new Party member and supervised and directed all political workers within his unit. To assist him in these efforts, the commissar usually had the help of the secretary for the local Party cell and of the Komsomol and the secretaries of any clubs. He was also assisted by part time propagandists, agitators and lecturers.
Weaknesses and Strengths
Weaknesses existed within the commissar system and were openly acknowledged by the Party. The military professionals deeply resented commissars’ influence on military matters, especially given the latters’ limited military expertise. Also, the commissars’ educational and indoctrination techniques included kritika (‘criticism’) and samokritika (‘self-criticism’) at mandatory Party meetings. Enlisted ranks or junior officers who were Party members were encouraged freely to criticize the decisions or personal behaviour of higher officers if these did not fit Party doctrine. This could severely undermine officers’ authority and self-respect. The commissar was required to note who said what and his opinion of an officer was critical for Party membership and for promotion. Clearly this could militate against showing initiative or original thinking in case deviation from the Party’s line was suspected; repetition of Party jargon, excessive indoctrination and rigid adherence to ‘norms’ did not encourage creativity.
In purely political terms, however, the commissar system worked well.Even when facing catastrophe during the dark days of 1941-42, the RKKA never openly rebelled against the Party nor sought to replace Stalin as leader. Large numbers of Soviet young men and women were indoctrinated in communist ideology and mass recruitment of promising members to the Komsomol and Party was carried out. The two primary political objectives of the Party's control system were achieved; no repeat of the mutiny of the tsar’s army against the state leading to another revolution and promotion of social change and control by the Party.
This was achieved at a high military price. During the 1930s, after Stalin took control of the Party and state on Lenin’s death, military effectiveness was held back by the commissar system. Time spent on political indoctrination and Marxist-Leninist training was lost to military training. Promotion and success came from following the Party line; creative, independent thinking, essential to development of advanced military skills and to the evolution of doctrine, was discouraged.
Dual authority made military decisions a committee process, something every army has found to be highly undesirable. It should be remembered, however, that the RKKA defeated what was perhaps the greatest assault any state has endured when Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941 and the Great Patriotic War began. Despite huge losses and vast damage inflicted upon it, it was the Red Army which liberated Eastern Europe, occupied Berlin and swept the Japanese out of Manchuria by 1945. During four years of immense bloodshed, deprivation and suffering, stability was maintained within the Soviet Union, something which the tsarist regime had failed to do despite having been in power for much longer than the Party. Hitler famously had said of the Soviet Union, that ‘We only have to kick in the door and the whole rotten edifice will come crashing down’. It didn’t and perhaps the commissars can take some credit for that.
